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We show that when in Lucas trees model the process for dividends is described by a lattice tree
subject to infrequent but observable structural breaks, in equilibrium recursive rational learning may
in￿ate the equity risk premium and reduce the risk-free interest rate for low levels of risk aversion. The
key condition for these results to obtain is the presence of suﬃcient initial pessimism. The relevance of
these ￿ndings is magni￿ed by the fact that under full information our arti￿cial economy cannot generate
asset returns matching the empirical evidence for any positive relative risk aversion.
JEL codes: G12, D83.
1. Introduction
Since Mehra and Prescott (1985, MP), we know that a Lucas-style economy with power, time-additive
expected utility, complete markets, no frictions, and in which a representative agent forms rational expec-
tations on the only source of risk (consumption) cannot reproduce the historical mean equity risk premium.
This impasse is labeled the equity premium puzzle. In practice, unreasonably high levels of relative risk
aversion must be used to get a sensible risk premium. Moreover, in MP￿s framework high risk aversion
implies an implausibly low elasticity of intertemporal substitution that forces the real riskless rate to levels
in excess of historical averages, the risk-free rate puzzle. Following MP (1985) a large eﬀort has been made
to explain these puzzles. Many papers have focused on the role of power, time-additive, expected utility
preferences constraining the elasticity of intertemporal substitution to be the inverse of the coeﬃcient of
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(434) 924-7654; Fax: (434) 982-2904; e-mail: mg8g@virginia.edurelative risk-aversion. The assumption of market completeness has been removed, showing that the non-
insurable uncertainty in individual consumption increases the equity premium. A literature has assessed
the importance of borrowing constraints and transaction costs.
Less attention has been given to the assumption of full-information rational expectations as a way
to close the model and impose some consistency on the mechanism by which beliefs are formed. Some
Authors have approached the puzzles leveraging on events unique to the US history, particularly the Great
Depression. Rietz (1988) shows that if agents are characterized by biases in beliefs re￿ecting catastrophic
scenarios not present in the historical data, a high equity premium is generated under reasonable risk
aversion. However the required crash state must be truly catastrophic. Danthine and Donaldson (1999)
explore the same concept, showing that Peso problems have more dramatic eﬀects in arti￿cial samples
in which crashes are not actually present. Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark (2000) study the eﬀects of belief
distortions on asset prices and show that some pessimism relative to the maximum-likelihood estimates
generates plausible moments. However, the origin of such pessimistic fears is unclear. This literature
therefore relies on deviations between realized and subjectively perceived beliefs, often in arbitrary ways.
On the opposite, in this paper we try to build a model in which rational pessimism and crash fears may
arise as a consequence of the application of simple but optimal estimation methods.
When agents lack full information on some parameters characterizing the environment, their subjective
beliefs may rationally deviate from the empirical distribution of the state variables without the need to
postulate in an ad-hoc fashion that markets agree on some disaster state. A few papers have studied
asset pricing under recursive learning (e.g. Barsky and De Long (1993), and Timmermann (1993, 2001)).
However, the implications for the equity premium are not pursued. An exception is Brennan and Xia
(2001): In a continuous-time general equilibrium setting a representative agent recursively estimates the
unobservable drift of dividends. Using a risk aversion coeﬃc i e n to f1 5a n dar a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c eo f
-10%, they derive an equity premium of 6 percent and a risk-free rate of 2.5 percent. However, Brennan
and Xia admit (p. 266) that learning has only second-order eﬀects on the equity premium.1 We show that
￿rst-order eﬀects can be obtained using a plausible degree of curvature of the utility function.
Our paper oﬀers two contributions. First, it removes the assumption lying at the core of the research
on the equity premium puzzle that agents form full-information (FI) rational expectations. We focus
on a restrictive rational learning mechanism that implies that prices re￿ect all possible, future perceived
distributions of the parameters￿ estimates (future learning). Second, we prove that under the assumptions
of MP (1985), when dividends follow a binomial lattice process, in equilibrium recursive rational learning
1MP (1985) argue that a γ in excess of 10 is unreasonable. According to D. Lucas (1994, p. 335) any solution that ￿(...)
does not explain the premium for [a coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion less or equal to] 2.5 is (...) likely to be widely viewed
as a resolution that depends on a high degree of risk aversion.￿ Hansen and Singleton (1983) estimate γ to be around 0.8.
2may in￿ate the equity risk premium and reduce the risk-free interest rate for low levels of risk aversion.
The key condition for these results to obtain is the presence of suﬃcient initial pessimism.
Rational learning introduces a new source of risk that supplements the scarce contribution coming from
real consumption growth: the instability of the pricing relation SRL
t = ΨRL
t Dt,w h e r eS is the asset price
and D the dividend. Our model follows the traditional literature in that the price of consumption risk is
determined by the coeﬃcient of relative risk aversion (γ). It turns out that ΨRL
t is the more reactive to
changes in beliefs along a learning path the lower γ is. In this sense a small degree of relative risk aversion
is able to balance the trade-oﬀ between the price of consumption risk and the quantity of risk induced by
the variability of the pricing kernel ΨRL
t in ways that oﬀer (quantitatively) useful insights.
Section 2 introduces the model. Section 3 characterizes equilibrium asset prices under full-information
rational expectations. This is a version of MP, specialized to the case of an i.i.d. binomial tree. Section
4 characterizes the rational learning scheme and derives expressions for asset prices. Section 5 discusses
the implications for the equity premium and the risk-free rate of the two assumptions on belief formation.
Section 6 provides additional comments and concludes.
2. The Model
The model is a version of the in￿nite horizon endowment economy studied by MP (1985). There are
two assets: a one-period, risk-free, zero coupon bond in endogenous zero supply, yielding an interest rate
of rt (hence Bt = 1
1+rt where B is the bond price), and a stock index with price St in exogenous net
unit supply. The stock pays an in￿nite stream of real dividends {Dt}
∞
t=1 . These dividends are perishable;
they cannot be reinvested and they must be consumed when they are received. The real growth rate of
dividends gt ≡ Dt
Dt−1 − 1 follows a two-state Bernoulli process with probability parameter π. At each date
the real growth rate is either high (gh, a business cycle expansion) or low (gl with −1 <g l < 0 <g h,
recession). When confronted with smooth processes such as US consumption growth, a zero ￿rst-order
autocorrelation is realistic.2 gh,g l, and π may be subject to structural breaks.3 For simplicity, assume
that breaks are observable. Events of the magnitude of the Great Depression and the world energy crises
are likely to be rapidly recognized. Thus, between today and T and conditioning on no breaks, the rate
of growth of dividends follows a (T − t)-steps binomial process by which the growth rate in each period
2Abel (2002) and Barsky and De Long (1993) stress that to a ￿rst approximation dividends follow a random walk. This
assumption is not completely at odds with the AR(1) model estimated in Section 2.1 as over the period 1930-1999 the recursive
estimates of the autoregressive coeﬃcient φ are always below 0.2 in absolute value and never statistically signi￿cant.
3Guidolin (2004) ￿nds that the null of no breaks is unequivocally rejected in correspondence to the mid 1930s, the Great
Depression. When the analysis is repeated conditioning on the occurrence of a ￿rst structural break during the 1930s (i.e. for
a shorter 1938-1999 period), a second break is located in correspondence to the early 1980s.
3[t,t +1 ]i s :
gt =
(
gh with prob. π
gl with prob. 1 − π
∀t ≥ 1, π ∈ (0,1) (1)
and the rates of growth are independent. We assume perfect capital markets: unlimited short sales, perfect
liquidity, no taxes, no transaction fees, no bid-ask spreads, and no borrowing constraints. There exists a








where Ct is real consumption. The agent maximizes the discounted value (at a rate ρ > 0) of the in￿nite
stream of expected future (instantaneous) utilities derived from the consumption of real dividends.
3. Asset Pricing Under Full Information Rational Expectations
A representative agent knows the stochastic process of dividends − the binomial structure and {gh,g l,πt} −
and forms rational expectations. Assume that breaks occur with such a low frequency to be safely disre-


















where β = 1
1+ρ, and ws
t+k, wb
t+k represent the number of shares of stocks and bonds in the agent￿s portfolio
as of period t + k. E [•|zt] ≡ Et[•] denotes the conditional expectation operator measurable with respect
to zt, the information set. Standard dynamic programming methods yield the following Euler equations:
St = E [Qt+1(St+1 + Dt+1) | zt]( 4 )
Bt = E [Qt+1 | zt], (5)







is the pricing kernel (stochastic discount factor) de￿ned as the prod-
uct of the subjective discount factor and the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution in consumption.
In equilibrium dividends are the only source of endowment and consumption, so Ct+k = Dt+k ∀k ≥ 0.
4Our empirical analysis has isolated only 2 breaks in a 110 years long time series, a frequency of 1.8%. Timmermann
(2001) uses a monthly probability of 0.3%. Guidolin (2004) calculates by simulation equilibrium prices when future, random
breaks are taken into account and concludes that closed-form solutions provide a good approximation.
4It is straightforward to prove that the full information rational expectations (FI) stock price, SFI
t ,i s
SFI













The linear homogenous form of the pricing function SFI
t = ΨFI
t Dt is a direct implication of expected
utility maximization, where ΨFI
t denotes the pricing kernel, i.e. the price-dividend ratio, see Abel (2002,
p. 1079) and Brennan and Xia (2001, p. 258), a time-varying function of πt. Assuming
ρ > πtg∗
h +( 1− πt)g∗
l , (7)
where g∗
l ≡ (1 + gl)1−γ − 1a n dg∗






















(1 + gl)−γ + πt [(1 + gh)−γ − (1 + gl)−γ]
− 1. (9)
Condition (7) ensures not only ΨFI
t > 0 but also existence of the equilibrium.5
4. Asset Prices on a Learning Path
Suppose the agent is on a learning path: he knows that dividends follow a lattice {gh,g l,πt}.H e a l s o
knows gh and gl.H o w e v e r ,πt is unknown and the agent estimates it using all the available information
























where I{gt+j=gh} takes value 1 when at step/time j of the binomial tree dividends grow at a high rate,
and zero otherwise. n
τb
t denotes the number of high growth states recorded between τb +1a n dt i m et,
while N
τb
t is the total number of dividend movements recorded over [τb +1 ,t]. After a break, investors










0 re￿ects a starting belief
agents hold on the probability of a good state, with 1/N
τb
0 the associated degree of precision.
Agents are on a rational learning (RL) path, see Guidolin and Timmermann (2003b), i.e. they take
into account that their beliefs on π will be updated for t0 >tand incorporate the eﬀects of future learning
5As shown in Guidolin and Timmernann (2003b), this condition is necessary and suﬃcient for existence.
6If breaks are observable, agents know when to restart their learning and discard previous information. If agents were
uncertain on the breaks, econometric methods to estimate the breaks should be used. We do not pursue this extension.
5in their current beliefs.7 This framework stresses that agents perceive their own future beliefs as random
variables measurable with respect to the sequence of future information sets. In the binomial tree model the
RL compounded probability distribution can be fully characterized. Guidolin and Timmermann (2003a,b)
prove that the distribution for the (gross) dividend growth rate between t and t + T is given by
PRL '













































(j−i)!i! is the permutation operator for T ≥ i,a n d
−1 Q
k=0
(•) = 1. The updated
probability distribution of dividends for period t + T only depends on the number of up-states occurring
between periods t and t + T − 1 and is independent of the speci￿c path followed on the binomial lattice.
Guidolin and Timmermann (2003a,b) solve the consumption problem and apply standard methods to
show that the following Euler equations characterize an internal optimum:








































t ]d e ￿nes an expectation conditional on the information available at time t,i np a r t i c u -
lar the current estimate of πt after the last break in τb <t . Since the sequence of conditional expectations




t+2, ..., b π
τb
t+T−1, the law of iterated
expectations can no longer be used as the distributions with respect to which future expectations are taken
should also discount future information. Once this fact is recognized, it is straightforward to prove that if
a transversality condition holds and ρ > max{g∗
l ,g∗

































(1 + gl)−γ + b π
τb
t [(1 + gh)−γ − (1 + gl)−γ]
− 1. (14)





t . In this sense, dividend changes between time t and t + 1 acquire a self-enforcing nature:
7Most of the papers in the asset pricing literature use adaptive, least-squares learning schemes that do not allow prices to
re￿ect the eﬀects of future learning. For instance, Barsky and De Long (1993) realize that their model ￿(...) does not allow
prices today to be in￿uenced by investors￿ knowledge that they will be revising their estimate (...) in the future￿ (p. 299).
6news of a certain sign will cause not only a stock price change through the linear pricing relationship
SRL
t = ΨRL
t Dt, but also through the revision of the pricing kernel, ΨRL
t . Moreover, while under FI the






5. Implications for the Equity Premium
5.1. Full information rational expectations
In the FI case, the mapping simply consists of a relationship between preferences [ργ ]0 and equilibrium





1+gl + πt(gh − gl)
πt(1 + g∗




πt(1 + gh)−γ +( 1− πt)(1 + gl)−γ
￿
. (15)
Since dividends are i.i.d., there is no diﬀerence between the time t conditional and unconditional equity
premium. Moreover, besides {gh,g l,πt}, (15) depends on [ργ ]0 only. To stress this dependency, we write
E[r
p,FI
t (ρ,γ)] and similarly r
f,FI
t (ρ,γ)a n dE[r
e,FI
t (ρ,γ)]. It is then natural to ask what is the shape of
E[r
p,FI
t (ρ,γ)] and equilibrium expected returns as [ργ ]0 vary.
Recalling condition (7), it turns out that investigating the behavior of equilibrium asset returns and
of the equity premium as [ργ ]0 changes implies two distinct sets of issues. Since given ρ and gl < 0at o o
high or too low γ may violate (7), a ￿rst crucial task is to characterize the interval (γ, ﬂ γ) ⊆ [0,+∞)o v e r
which the FI equilibrium exists, such that (15) and other quantities of interest are actually de￿ned. To
this purpose we introduce the following notation. De￿ne
Ke
t(γ) ≡ πtg∗
h +( 1− πt)g∗
l ,
the denominator (minus one) of the stock return implied by (8), and K
f
t (γ) ≡ πt[(1+gh)−γ −1]+(1−πt)
[(1 + gl)−γ − 1], the denominator (minus one) of (9). Notice that K
f
t (γ)=Ke
t(γ +1 )a n d
E[r
e,FI
t (ρ,γ)] = (1 + ρ)











(7) can then be re-written as 1 + ρ > 1+Ke
t(γ). Since
Ke
t(0) = πtgh +( 1− πt)gl = E[gt]l i m
γ→∞supKe
t(γ)=∞,
(7) fails as γ →∞or, equivalently, one can ￿nd a ﬂ γ(ρ) < ∞ such that only for γ < ﬂ γ(ρ) the equilibrium
exists. As for γ(ρ), if ρ >E [gt]t h e nγ(ρ) = 0; otherwise if one can ￿nd a γ(ρ) > 0 such that 1 + ρ =
1+Ke
t(γ(ρ)), the equilibrium exists only for γ > γ(ρ). Naturally, it makes sense to study the behavior of
7the equity premium and of asset returns as a function of [ργ ]0 only when such returns (and diﬀerentials
thereof) are de￿ned in equilibrium, i.e. for γ ∈ (γ(ρ), ﬂ γ(ρ)). Interestingly, for ρ > 0 (as assumed) the
equilibrium always exists since 1 + ρ > 1+Ke
t(1) = 1 holds. Thus either (γ(ρ), ﬂ γ(ρ)) is an interval or
it reduces to the singleton {1}. Since ﬂ γ(ρ) < ∞, it follows that in this lattice model one cannot always
generate a realistic equity premium by simply increasing γ and exploiting the agent￿s risk aversion.
Assuming the equilibrium exists on an interval (γ(ρ), ﬂ γ(ρ)), it becomes then interesting to investigate
the behavior of expected asset returns and the equity premium as γ changes. The following result charac-
terizes the basic properties of asset returns in this arti￿cial economy. Let, whenever de￿ned, γe, γf,a n d
γmax be the maximum points on (γ(ρ), ﬂ γ(ρ)) of the risk-free rate, expected stock returns, and the equity
risk premium (as functions of γ), respectively.
Proposition 1. Assume the full-information rational expectations equilibrium exists on (γ(ρ), ﬂ γ(ρ)).
(a) E[r
e,FI
t (ρ,γ)] may be either monotone decreasing in γ or it may be at ￿rst increasing over (γ(ρ),
γe) and then decreasing over (γe, ﬂ γ(ρ)). There exists a ρ∗ such that for all ρ ≥ ρ∗ E[r
e,FI
t (ρ,γ)] admits a
global maximum at γe.
(b) r
f,FI
t (ρ,γ) may be either monotone decreasing in γ or it may be at ￿rst increasing over (γ(ρ), γf)
and then decreasing over (γf, ﬂ γ(ρ)). If and only if ρ ≥ ρ∗ such that γe > 1,r
f,FI
t (ρ,γ) admits a global
maximum at γf. Furthermore, γf < γe.
(c) E[r
p,FI
t (ρ,γ)] may be either monotone increasing in γ or it may be at ￿rst increasing over (γ(ρ),
γmax(ρ)) and then decreasing over (γmax, ﬂ γ(ρ)).T h e r ee x i s t saρ∗∗ such that for all ρ ≥ ρ∗∗ E[r
p,FI
t (ρ,γ)]
admits a global maximum at γmax.
Proof: See Appendix.
Parts (a) and (b) have a clear interpretation: since under power utility the intertemporal rate of
substitution is the inverse of γ, eventually equilibrium asset returns must decline as γ increases and the
rate of intertemporal substitution vanishes. The intuition is that a low intertemporal rate of substitution
gives strong incentives to the agent to smooth consumption by demanding tradeable assets; given exogenous
supply, strong demand increases equilibrium prices and lowers expected rates of return. Logically, this
eﬀect is weakened when an agent strongly discounts future consumption streams (high ρ): in this case,
despite the strong consumption-smoothing motive, future portfolio payoﬀs receive less weight than current
consumption. In fact, if ρ is suﬃciently high, there exists a range of values in (γ(ρ), ﬂ γ(ρ)) over which
expected asset returns increase in γ. In the case of stocks, this derives from the need to be compensated
for risk; in the case of bonds from that fact that when γe > 1, parameters are such that over (γ(ρ), γf)t h e
agent would like to short-sell bonds to invest more in stocks and this drives interest rates up. Interestingly,
the phenomenon is stronger for bonds in the sense that there is a range (γf,γe)o v e rw h i c ht h er i s k - f r e e
8rate declines in γ while expected stock returns increase: Investors use at ￿rst bonds for consumption
smoothing purposes while risk averse investors keep requiring higher stock returns as γ increases.
Part (c) is more puzzling and implies that − provided ρ is suﬃciently high − the equity premium is
declining in γ over (γmax, ﬂ γ(ρ)), contrary to standard intuition that more risk-averse investors are rewarded
higher risk premia. Over selected sub-intervals of (γ(ρ), ﬂ γ(ρ)) this result is a mechanical consequence of
( a )-( b )f o rt h ec a s ei nw h i c hρ is suﬃciently high and γe ∈ (γ(ρ), ﬂ γ(ρ)). If γe ≤ 1, then there exists a
region (γ(ρ), γe) over which expected stock returns increase in γ while the risk-free rate declines: over
that region the equity premium must be increasing. A similar eﬀect takes place when γe > 1: there
exists an interval (γf,γe) over which expected stock returns increase in γ w h i l et h er i s k - f r e er a t ed e c l i n e s .
This depends on the fact that bond prices seem to be aﬀected by the progressive decline in the elasticity
of substitution ￿before￿ stocks are. Finally, over (γ(ρ), γf) (assuming γf exists) both expected stock
returns and the risk-free rate are increasing, but it turns out that E[r
e,FI
t (ρ,γ)] increases at a faster rate
than r
f,FI
t (ρ,γ); on the opposite, in (γe, ﬂ γ(ρ)) the equity premium must eventually be decreasing in γ
as E[r
e,FI
t (ρ,γ)] decreases faster than the risk-free rate. In both cases, however, the idea is still that a
declining intertemporal rate of substitution seems to hit bond prices at a comparatively stronger rate than
stock prices. Given the inverse relationship between asset prices and expected returns, we obtain (c).
The proposition oﬀers direct implications for the possibility to produce under FI plausible equity
premia and interest rates. The naive notion that a high γ oﬀers a way to resolve the puzzles does not
apply. From (c), we can only hope that ﬂ γ(ρ) is high enough to span an interval that includes a γ (either
γmax or ﬂ γ(ρ)) such that a risk premium as high as in the data obtains.
5.2. Rational Learning






t ;ρ,γ)Dt. Therefore ￿ assuming the absence of a structural break between t and t+1
















































Ad i ﬀerent concept is the equity premium expected at time t, conditional on the information on the







































t [(1 + gt+1)−γ]
.
(17)
Notice that (17) represents a subjective notion of the equity premium as ￿ E
τb
t [•] is a subjective expectation






















i.e. the objective unconditional equity premium (left-hand side) on a rational learning path diﬀers from
the objectively expected subjective equity premium (right-hand side). This diﬀerence raises an important
issue. Traditionally, the literature has discussed the circumstances under which a model generates a
stationary distribution for excess returns matching sample moments. In particular, the equity premium
E[r
p
t+1(ρ,γ)] is identi￿ed as a long-run sample mean of excess equity returns. While E[r
p,RL
t+1 (ρ,γ)] can be
quanti￿ed by simulating prices in (16) and (14) and taking averages over simulation trials, this quantity is in










that can be similarly obtained by simulation.
Although the average (expected) subjective equity premium may be interesting in itself (see Abel (2000)),
it is clear that the only quantity that can be directly compared to the data is E[r
p,RL
t+1 (ρ,γ)].
This section reports results for the objective conditional expectation of the equity premium under
RL; Section 7 uses simulations from a calibrated version of our model to produce results on the objective
unconditional premium to be compared with the empirical evidence. Guidolin and Timmermann (2003b)
show that ΨRL
t is an increasing and convex function of n
τb







































































































￿lls the gap between the objective Et[ΨRL




t+1] (calculated using ￿ πt). It is straightforward to show that when beliefs are pessimistic, b π
τb
t < πt,





weaker than those caused by pessimism. Using these results we can state the following:































We are able to isolate a combination of risk-aversion and beliefs ￿ low risk aversion and pessimism ￿
for which the conditional risk premium is higher under RL than the (unconditional) risk premium under
FI. In principle, the incorporation of learning eﬀects points in the direction of higher equity premia for
plausible preferences, provided the economy is characterized ￿on average￿ by some degree of pessimism.
Moreover, under the same assumptions, r
f,RL
t (ρ,γ) ≤ r
f,FI
t (ρ,γ) should make the occurrence of a risk-free
rate puzzle unlikely. However, Proposition 2 has only partial relevance for the quantitative assessment of
the unconditional risk premium. On one hand, a straightforward corollary to Proposition 2 obtains:



















t ) < πt) such that the initial precision N
τb
0 in (10) is




























































t ]0 is such that b π
τb
t is suﬃciently below πt and N
τb
0 is suﬃciently large,
there is a T such that in (10) b π
τb
j < πt ∀j ∈ [t,T]e v e ni ft h er e a l i z a t i o n so ft h ed i v i d e n dg r o w t hr a t ea r e
uniformly high in [t,T], i.e. for all sample paths that beliefs may follow. Clearly, given b π
τb
t the higher is N
τb
0 ,
the higher is T. From Proposition 2, b π
τb









j+1 (ρ,γ)] independently of the speci￿ct i m ej beliefs. Therefore, summing over all possible future
values of n
τb


























The inequality for the premium follows. Identical steps lead to the claim concerning the riskless rate. 2
In short, the Corollary states that although nothing can be said about the unconditional equity pre-
mium and risk-free rates, provided that the averaging takes place over a suﬃciently short sample [t,T],
11mean excess returns (riskless interest rates) will exceed (be inferior) to the FI unconditional levels inde-
pendently of the sample path of beliefs over [t,T]. I m p o r t a n t l y ,t h et y p eo ft i m ea v e r a g e sa p p e a r i n gi nt h e
Corollary correspond to the estimates of the equity premium we will consider in the simulations of Section
7.
Contrary to the FI case, under RL it is diﬃcult to characterize the behavior of equilibrium expected
returns and of the equity premium as a function of preferences only. In fact, no analog to Proposition 1 can
be proven because ρ and γ have eﬀects on asset returns that depend on the state of beliefs, b π
τb
t . The most
striking property of the equity premium under RL is that − contrary to Proposition 1(c) − for γ < 1a n d
pessimistic beliefs, it is possible for the conditional premium to be decreasing in γ < 1 over some range.
This fact implies the possibility of increasing the equity premium generated by the model by lowering γ,
instead of increasing it. In the light of the vast debate on what upper bound on the coeﬃcient of relative
risk aversion is plausible, it is crucial to ￿nd explanations for the high historical premium relying on low
risk aversion. Our intuition for this result is that as an economy becomes risk-neutral, the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution (1/γ) becomes larger and r
f,RL
t (ρ,γ) declines towards ρ while the demand for
bonds decreases as the agent reduces her allocation to bonds for consumption smoothing reasons. Even
though (14) implies that interest rates rise as the pessimism is eliminated by repeated observation of the
fundamental outcomes, such an economy is characterized by modest risk-free rates. On the other hand,
over time the agent revises her pessimistic beliefs towards the true, unobserved πt. Since the RL pricing
kernel increases in n
τb
t , the price-dividend ratio progressively climbs up and generates high stock returns.
6. Discussion
RB are beliefs about state variables that are generally incorrect but that are not inconsistent with the
unconditional properties of the unknown DGP. Simulations in Kurz (1996, 1997) and Kurz and Motolese
(2001) have documented that under parametric restrictions on the distribution of beliefs across agents,
high premia may be generated along with low interest rates. Restrictions on beliefs are equivalent to
patterns of prevalence and intensity of pessimists vs. optimists. In Kurz and Motolese (2001) a key
condition requires that on average the majority of agents are optimistic about the prospects of capital
gains while a minority is more intensely pessimistic.
There are obvious similarities between the learning-based and the RB approaches. First, we also
study the case in which agents fail to know distribution of state variables. Agents are wrong about
the distribution of state variables at all dates, although by standard asymptotic arguments the long-run
distribution can eventually be learnt. Departures of beliefs from the unknown true distribution generate
￿uctuations in asset prices that diﬀer from rational expectations values. Second, we study a stable but
12non-stationary system characterized by infrequent structural breaks, i.e. we approximate non-stationarity
with a sequence of time intervals over which the unknown DGP is invariant, see Kurz￿s (1997) notion of
￿environments￿. Third, also the RB approach to the equity premium puzzle has generated results from
restrictions on the structure of beliefs that can be read in terms of pessimism vs. optimism. We do the
same, although our restriction is weaker and concerns only initial beliefs after the occurrence of breaks
and not the entire sample path. One can see rational learning as a selection device for one set of rational
beliefs.
Clearly, the crucial diﬀerence consists in the fact that RB theory has focused on the eﬀects of het-
erogeneity, in the sense that divergent beliefs are not only allowed under RB, but they are essential for
the approach to produce interesting pricing implications. On the contrary, our paper adopts the standard
￿ction of a representative agent and thus concentrates on the eﬀects of dynamics in beliefs. Second, while
in our model this dynamics is governed by the realizations of the dividend process, RB theory has em-
ployed the additional construct of generating variables (Nielsen (1996)). Although these variables are not
essential to RB theory and they could be a function of observed state variables, in Kurz (1997, 1998), and
Kurz and Motolese (2001) they are assumed to be independently and identically distributed. Therefore
recursive rational learning imposes a further restriction on the mapping between observed variables and
belief dynamics. Third, RB theory lists future spot asset prices as part of the state space, that is therefore
enlarged to imply endogenous uncertainty. In our model uncertainty remains strictly exogenous, although
it is greatly ampli￿ed by learning. Fourth, while the RB literature has simultaneously explained a number
of features of ￿nancial markets besides the equity premium and the risk-free rate puzzles (e.g. the forward
exchange rate puzzle, long-horizon predictability, endogenous stochastic volatility, etc. see Kurz, Jin, and
Motolese (2003)), our RL model can only claim partial success on the ￿rst two moments of the most prim-
itive asset returns and shows some de￿ciency when its dynamic (conditional) implications are assessed.
We conjecture that only extensions that jointly model recursive learning eﬀects and heterogeneous beliefs
about other agents￿ beliefs might provide a uni￿ed framework to understand asset prices.
In conclusion, although diﬀerences remain, both approaches to the puzzles spring oﬀ the principle that
the structure and dynamic of agents￿ beliefs are as important primitive explanations variables of economic
phenomena as the usual list of ￿suspects￿, preferences, technology, and frictions/constraints.
This paper shows that there exists an alternative way in which extreme events such as the Great
Depression or the oil shocks can generate high equity premia. While previous literature has focused on
the induced, permanent biases in the stationary beliefs of investors in an ad hoc fashion, we show that if
agents are on a recursive learning path, tail events may produce long-lasting eﬀects on equilibrium prices.
13References
[1] Abel, A., 2002, ￿An Exploration of the Eﬀects of Pessimism and Doubt on Asset Returns￿, Journal
of Economic Dynamics and Control, 26, 1075-1092.
[2] Barsky, R., and B., De Long, 1993, ￿Why Does the Stock Market Fluctuate?￿, Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 108, 291-311.
[3] Brennan, M., and Y., Xia, 2001, ￿Stock Price Volatility and Equity Premium￿, Journal of Monetary
Economics, 47, 249-283.
[4] Cecchetti, S., P. Lam, and N., Mark, 2000, ￿Asset Pricing with Distorted Beliefs: Are Equity Returns
Too Good To Be True?￿, American Economic Review, 90, 787-805.
[5] Danthine, J.-P., and J. Donaldson, 1999, ￿Non-Falsi￿ed Expectations and General Equilibrium Asset
Pricing: The Power of the Peso￿, Economic Journal, 109, 607-635.
[6] Guidolin, M., 2004, ￿Pessimistic Beliefs Under Rational Learning: Quantitative Implications for the
Equity Premium Puzzle￿, mimeo, University of Virginia.
[7] Guidolin, M., and A., Timmermann, 2003a, ￿Option Prices Under Bayesian Learning: Implied Volatil-
ity Dynamics and Predictive Densities￿, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 27, 717-769.
[8] Guidolin, M., and A., Timmermann, 2003b, ￿Properties of Asset Prices Under Alternative Learning
Schemes￿, mimeo, University of Virginia and UCSD.
[9] Hansen, L. P., and K. Singleton, 1983, ￿Stochastic Consumption, Risk Aversion, and the Temporal
Behavior of Asset Returns￿, Journal of Political Economy, 91, 249-265.
[10] Kurz, M., 1994, ￿On the Structure and Diversity of Rational Beliefs￿, Economic Theory, 4, 877-900.
[11] Kurz, M., 1997, ￿Asset Prices with Rational Beliefs￿, in Kurz, M. (ed.), Endogenous Economic
Fluctuations: Studies in the Theory of Rational Belief, pp. 211-250, Springer, New York.
[12] Kurz, M., 1998, ￿Social States of Belief and the Determinants of the Equity Risk Premium in a Ra-
tional Belief Equilibrium￿, in Abramovich, Y., Avgerinos, E., Yannelis, N. (eds.), Functional Analysis
and Economic Theory, pp. 171-220, Springer, New York.
[13] Kurz, M., and H., Jin, and M., Motolese, 2003, ￿Determinants of Stock Market Volatility and Risk
Premia￿, mimeo, Stanford University.
14[14] Kurz, M., and M., Motolese, 2001, ￿Endogenous Uncertainty and Market Volatility￿, Economic The-
ory, 17, 497-544.
[15] Lucas, D., 1994, ￿Asset Pricing with Undiversi￿able Risk and Short Sales Constraints: Deepening
the Equity Premium Puzzle￿, Journal of Monetary Economics, 34, 325-342.
[16] Mehra, R., and E., Prescott, 1985, ￿The Equity Premium: A Puzzle￿, Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, 10, 335-359.
[17] Nielsen, C., 1996, ￿Rational Belief Structures and Rational Belief Equilibria￿, Economic Theory,8 ,
399-422.
[18] Rietz, T., 1988, ￿The Equity Risk Premium: A Solution￿, Journal of Monetary Economics, 22,
117-132.
[19] Timmermann, A., 1993, ￿How Learning in Financial Markets Generates Volatility and Predictability
in Stock Prices￿, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 1135-1145.
[20] Timmermann, A., 2001, ￿Structural Breaks, Incomplete Information and Stock Prices￿, Journal of
Business and Economic Statistics, 19, 299-314.
Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 .(a) To establish how expected stock returns change as a function of γ (for given
ρ), let￿s study the behavior of Ke
t(γ)i n( γ,ﬂ γ). Diﬀerentiating Ke
t(γ) with respect to γ we get a function
ke
t(γ) ≡ dKe(γ)/dγ de￿ned as:
ke
t(γ)=−πt[(ln(1 + gh))(1 + gh)1−γ] − (1 − πt)[(ln(1 + gl))(1 + gl)1−γ].
When gh > 0 >g l > −1,k e
t(γ) is strictly increasing in γ (each of the summands is), and limγ→∞ supke
t(γ)=
∞. The behavior of E[r
e,FI
t (ρ,γ)] can be completely characterized by these properties of ke
t(γ)a n dt h e
behavior of ke
t(γ)a tγ = 0, which depends on ρ. Four cases can be considered:
(i) ke
t(0) < 0a n d1+ρ ≤ 1+Ke
t(0) = 1 + πtgh +( 1− πt)gl. Since ke
t(γ) is continuous in γ,k e
t(0) < 0
and ke
t(γ) →∞as γ →∞ ,t h e r ee x i s t saγe such that ke
t(γe)=0 , i.e. Ke
t(γ) is U-shaped with a global
minimum in γe. This implies the existence of γ(ρ)a n dﬂ γ(ρ) such that 1+ρ =1+Ke
t(γ(ρ)) = 1+Ke
t(ﬂ γ(ρ))
and γe ∈ (γ(ρ), ﬂ γ(ρ)). Therefore E[r
e,FI
t (ρ,γ)] is bell-shaped with an interior global maximum at γe.
(ii) ke
t(0) < 0a n d1+ρ > 1+Ke
t(0). Similarly to case (i), there must exist a γe such that ke
t(γe)=0 ,
i.e. Ke
t(γ) is U-shaped with a global minimum in γe. However in this case there is no γ(ρ) ≥ 0 such that
1+ρ =1+Ke
t(γ(ρ)) since 1+ρ > 1+Ke
t(0). Therefore γ(ρ)=0 . On the other hand, there is a ﬂ γ(ρ) < ∞
such that 1 + ρ =1+Ke
t(ﬂ γ(ρ)).E [r
e,FI
t (ρ,γ)] is bell-shaped with an interior global maximum at γe.
(iii) ke
t(0) ≥ 0a n d1+ρ ≤ 1+Ke
t(0). Since ke
t(γ) is positive over [0,∞),K e
t(γ)i sac o n v e xa n d
everywhere strictly increasing function. This implies that for no value of γ 6=1( 7 )i ss a t i s ￿ed, as
151+ρ ≤ 1+Ke
t(0) < 1+Ke
t(γ). Therefore this case is empty and the interval (γ(ρ),ﬂ γ(ρ)) collapses
to the singleton γ =1 .
(iv) ke
t(0) ≥ 0a n d1+ρ > 1+Ke
t(0). Since ke
t(γ) is positive over [0,∞),K e
t(γ) is a convex and everywhere
strictly increasing function. While we let γ(ρ) = 0 for the same reasons in (ii), there is a ﬂ γ(ρ) < ∞ such
that 1 + ρ =1+Ke
t(ﬂ γ(ρ)). In this case, E[r
e,FI
t (ρ,γ)] is monotone decreasing over (0, ﬂ γ(ρ)).
In conclusion, when the equilibrium exists on an interval (γ(ρ), ﬂ γ(ρ)) and given ρ, E[r
e,FI
t (ρ,γ)] is either
be l l - s h a pe dw i t ha ni n t e r i o rg l o b a lm a x i m u mγe independent of ρ (cases (i) and (ii)) or monotone decreasing
in γ (case (iv)). Since as ρ →∞only cases (ii) and (iv) become possible, limsupρ→∞ γ(ρ)=0a n d
limsupρ→∞ ﬂ γ(ρ)=∞, there exists a ρ∗ such that for ρ ≥ ρ∗ γe ∈ (γ(ρ), ﬂ γ(ρ)) represents the global
maximum for expected stock returns.
(b) To establish how expected stock returns change as a function of γ (for given ρ), study the behavior
of K
f
t (γ)i n( γ,ﬂ γ). Diﬀerentiating K
f
t (γ) w.r.t. γ we get a function k
f
t (γ) ≡ dKf(γ)/dγ:
k
f
t (γ)=−πt[(ln(1 + gh))(1 + gh)−γ] − (1 − πt)[(ln(1 + gl))(1 + gl)−γ].
Clearly, K
f
t (0) = 0, when gh > 0 >g l > −1 k
f
t (γ)i ss t r i c t l yi n c r e a s i n gi nγ (each of the summands
is), and limγ→∞ supke
t(γ)=∞. Two cases are then relevant: either ke
t(0) ≥ 0s ot h a tke
t(γ) > 0 for all
γ￿s, or ke
t(0) < 0 so the continuity of ke
t(γ)i nγ implies that a γf can be found such that ke
t(γf)=0 .
In the former case, K
f
t (γ) is a convex and monotonic increasing function, implying that r
f,FI
t (ρ,γ)i s
monotonically decreasing in γ. In the latter case, K
f
t (γ) is U-shaped, implying that r
f,FI
t (ρ,γ)i sb e l l -
shaped with a global maximum over [0,∞) (independent of ρ). This last result does not imply though that




t (γ), it follows that k
f
t (γ − 1) = ke




t (γe − 1) = k
f
t (γf)=0 . Therefore γf = γe − 1a n dγe > γf. Therefore an interior global minimum for
k
f
t (γ) (hence an interior global maximum for the risk-free rate) over (γ(ρ), ﬂ γ(ρ)) exists if and only if γe
exists and γf = γe − 1 > 0o rγe > 1.
In conclusion, when the equilibrium exists in (γ(ρ),ﬂ γ(ρ)), r
f,FI
t (ρ,γ) is either bell-shaped with an interior
global maximum γf or monotone decreasing in γ. Since it is always possible to ￿nd a ρ∗ such that for
ρ ≥ ρ∗ γe ∈ (γ(ρ),ﬂ γ(ρ)), analogously for ρ ≥ ρ∗ there exists γf ∈ (γ(ρ),ﬂ γ(ρ)) if and only if γe > 1.
(c) Finally, the equity premium is simply the diﬀerence between E[r
e,FI
t (ρ,γ)] and r
f,FI
t (ρ,γ). Given
γ, (15) makes it evident that the premium is an increasing function of ρ. On the interval [0,∞)i ti s
clear that E[r
e,FI
t (ρ,0)] = 1 + ρ = r
f,FI
t (ρ,0) so that E[r
p,FI
t (ρ,0)] = 0, which corresponds to standard
intuition, a risk-neutral investor will demand a zero risk premium; also, since limsupγ→∞ E[r
e,FI
t (ρ,0)] =
−1=l i m s u p γ→∞ r
f,FI
t (ρ,0), it follows that limsupγ→∞ E[r
p,FI
t (ρ,0)] = 0. However E[r
p,FI
t (ρ,0)] is the
diﬀerence of two continuous functions of γ and is everywhere non-negative since positivity of (15) is
guaranteed by:
[1 + gl + πt(gh − gl)]
£
πt(1 + gh)−γ +( 1− πt)(1 + gl)−γ⁄
> πt(1 + gh)1−γ +( 1− πt)(1 + gl)1−γ
=⇒ [πt(1 + gh)+( 1− πt)(1 + gl)]
£
πt(1 + gh)−γ +( 1− πt)(1 + gl)−γ⁄
>
> πt(1 + gh)(1 + gh)−γ +( 1− πt)(1 + gl)(1 + gl)−γ > πt(1 + gh)1−γ +( 1− πt)(1 + gl)1−γ.
Given the assumption of (weak) risk aversion this result is almost obvious. As such there exists a global
maximum γmax ∈ (0,∞) (independent of ρ), and E[r
p,FI
t (ρ,0)] is at ￿rst increasing and then decreasing.
16The existence of γmax ∈ (0,∞)d o e sn o ti m p l yγmax ∈ (γ(ρ), ﬂ γ(ρ)). However, from the properties of Ke
t(γ)
in (a), it is clear that limsupρ→∞ γ(ρ) = 0 and limsupρ→∞ ﬂ γ(ρ)=∞, so that there exists a ρ∗∗ such that
for ρ ≥ ρ∗∗ γmax ∈ (γ(ρ),ﬂ γ(ρ)) represents the global maximum for the FI equity premium. 2
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n2 . All the expectations are taken with respect to true probability measure πt.

















0 . The proof exploits a result in Guidolin and Timmermann (2003b), Proposition 4,





Since for γ < 1 ΨRL
t is increasing in ￿ π
τb
t and pessimism is de￿ned as ￿ π
τb
t < πt, it follows that ΨRL
t < ΨFI
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where the last line uses the fact that ￿ π
τb
t < πt whereas ΨRL(￿ n
τb
t +1, ￿ N
τb
t +1)> ΨRL(￿ n
τb
t , ￿ N
τb
t +1)follows
f r o mt h ef a c tt h a tR Lp r i c i n gk e r n e li si n c r e a s i n gi n￿ n
τb
t .D e ￿ne now †∗ and δ∗ as in (18) - (19). †∗(￿ n
τb
t , ￿ N
τb
t )
is a positive function (Guidolin and Timmermann (2003b) show that under γ < 1a n dg i v e n￿ n
τb




t+1 is decreasing in ￿ N
τb
t )i m p l i c i t l yd e ￿ned by
λ†(￿ n
τb
t , ￿ N
τb
t ,† ∗;ρ,γ,g h,g l) ≡ ΨRL(￿ n
τb
t + †∗, ￿ N
τb
t +1 )− ΨRL(￿ n
τb
t , ￿ N
τb
t )=0 ,
and it is continuous (from continuity of ΨRL
t+1 in its arguments). As for δ∗, under the assumption of
pessimistic beliefs, it is non-negative and de￿ned by the function
λδ(πt, ￿ n
τb
t , ￿ N
τb
t ,δ∗;ρ,γ,g h,g l) ≡ πtΨRL(￿ n
τb
t +1 , ￿ N
τb
t +1 )+( 1− πt)ΨRL(￿ n
τb


























t + δ∗, ￿ N
τb
t +1 )=0 .
Since for given πt, ￿ n
τb
t , ￿ N
τb
t , λ(πt, ￿ n
τb
t , ￿ N
τb
t ,δ∗) is continuous, strictly decreasing and changes sign over
δ∗ ∈ [0,∞), δ∗ is in fact implicitly de￿ned by λ(πt, ￿ n
τb
t , ￿ N
τb
t ,δ∗) = 0 as a function of πt, ￿ n
τb
t , and ￿ N
τb
t
(besides preferences and the dividend process), δ∗(πt, ￿ n
τb
t , ￿ N
τb
t ); from continuity of ΨRL
t+1 in its arguments,
λ(πt, ￿ n
τb
t , ￿ N
τb
t ,δ∗) is also continuous and as such δ∗(πt, ￿ n
τb
t , ￿ N
τb
t ) is continuous in its arguments.
Given some πt,w en o wl o o kf o rap a i rb ￿ n
τb
t , b ￿ N
τb
t such that b ￿ n
τb
t /b ￿ N
τb
t > 0, δ∗(πt,b ￿ n
τb
t , b ￿ N
τb
t )=†∗(b ￿ n
τb
t , b ￿ N
τb
t )
or ∆(πt,b ￿ n
τb
t , b ￿ N
τb
t ) ≡ δ∗(πt,b ￿ n
τb
t , b ￿ N
τb
t )−†∗(b ￿ n
τb
t , b ￿ N
τb
t )=0 . Notice that ∆(πt, ￿ n
τb
t , ￿ N
τb
t ) is continuous because
17δ∗and †∗ are continuous. Consider ￿rst the case of no pessimism, ￿ n
τb
t / ￿ N
τb
t = πt:i nt h i sc a s e†∗ > δ∗ =0a n d
∆(πt, ￿ n
τb
t , ￿ N
τb
t ) < 0. On the contrary, under extreme pessimism − i.e. ￿ n
τb
t =0g i v e n ￿ N
τb
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Clearly, the sum is nil insofar as ΨRL(†∗, ￿ N
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t +1) > 0. This implies: ΨRL(0, ￿ N
τb
t +1) < ΨRL(δ∗, ￿ N
τb
t +1)andδ∗ >† ∗, i.e. ∆(πt, ￿ n
τb
t , ￿ N
τb
t ) >
0. Therefore, as ￿ n
τb
t , ￿ N
τb
t change over the pessimistic range 0 ≤ ￿ n
τb
t / ￿ N
τb
t ≤ πt, ∆(πt, ￿ n
τb
t , ￿ N
τb
t )s w i t c h e s
sign, from negative to positive. From standard results, it then follows that a pair b ￿ n
τb
t , b ￿ N
τb
t exists such that
∆(πt,b ￿ n
τb
t , b ￿ N
τb
t )=0 , i.e. δ∗ = †∗ with b ￿ n
τb
t /b ￿ N
τb
t > 0. This shows that the set of pairs ￿ n
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The second inequality follows from an application of Jensen￿s inequality to the convex ΨRL
t ,t h ef o l l o w -
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1+ρ
πt(1 + gh)−γ +( 1− πt)(1 + gl)−γ = r
f,FI
t (ρ,γ),
the FI risk-free rate, since (1 + gh)−γ < (1 + gl)−γ and ￿ π
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t < πt. Finally, since the equity premium is the
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